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Abstract
This article studies the consequences of price discrimination in a
market for experts’ services. In the case of experts markets, where
the expert observes the intervention that a consumer needs to ﬁxh i s
problem and also provides a treatment, price discrimination proceeds
along the dimension of quality of advice oﬀered. High quality advice
and appropriate treatment is provided to the most proﬁtable market
segment only. Less proﬁtable consumers are induced to demand either
unnecessary or insuﬃcient procedures. The welfare consequences of
price discrimination are ambiguous: On the one hand, price discrimi-
nation increases the number of consumers that get an intervention. On
the other hand, some consumers that are eﬃciently served under non-
discrimination get the wrong procedure if the expert can discriminate
among customers.
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i1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This article studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for
credence goods. Credence goods have the characteristic that, even when
consumers can observe the utility they derive from the good ex post, they
cannot judge whether the quality they received is the ex ante needed one.
Moreover, depending on the concrete example, consumers may also be unable
to observe which quality they actually received. An expert seller, on the other
hand, is able to identify the quality that ﬁts customers’ needs by performing
a diagnosis. He can then recommend and provide the right quality, or he
can exploit the information asymmetry by defrauding customers. Darby and
Karni (1973) added this type of goods to Nelson’s (1970) classiﬁcation in
ordinary, search and experience goods. They mention provision of repair
services, execution of taxicab rides and removal of appendices as typical
examples.
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2001) provide a uniforming framework to ana-
lyze the behavior of experts in credence goods markets. They show in a sur-
vey fashion that the market works eﬃciently if three conditions hold, namely
(i) that either experts are liable to provide suﬃcient treatment or customers
are able to observe the quality of treatment they receive (but not necessarily
able to judge whether the quality was really necessary), (ii) that getting a
second opinion is suﬃciently costly because there exist pronounced economies
of scope between diagnosis and treatment and (iii) that consumers are homo-
geneous. Whereas many contributions focus on the relaxation of conditions
(i) and (ii) the present paper studies the eﬀects of heterogeneous consumers
in a setting where experts have market power.
With heterogeneous consumers and experts who have market power price
discrimination may emerge in equilibrium. We show that a non-discriminating
expert serves her customers honestly but prices might be such that some con-
sumers do not consult her even though serving them would be eﬃcient. This
is nothing but the familiar monopoly-pricing ineﬃciency: The expert would
like to appropriate as much of the net gain from treatment as possible but,
because of heterogeneous consumers he puts up with loosing some customers
in order to get a higher price from the remaining ones. Price discrimina-
tion alleviates this problem but brings in a new dimension of ineﬃciency:
With price discrimination the expert provides low quality diagnosis to some
consumers. As a result those consumers either demand unnecessary or insuf-
ﬁcient procedures.
1If consumers diﬀer in the probability of needing diﬀerent interventions
then low risk consumers get high quality diagnosis and appropriate treat-
ment while high risk consumers are potentially overtreated; that is, they are
induced to demand a high quality intervention without a serious diagnosis.
By contrast, under heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful intervention
high valuation consumers get eﬃcient diagnosis and treatment, while low
valuation ones are potentially undertreated; that is, they are induced to de-
mand a simple procedure independently of the severity of their problem. In
both cases the welfare consequences of price discrimination are ambiguous:
On the one hand, price discrimination potentially increases the number of
consumers that get a treatment. On the other hand, some consumers that
are eﬃciently served in the non-discrimination case get the wrong procedure
if the expert can discriminate among customers.
Let us now detail our framework and ﬁndings. We build our contribution
on existing models of credence goods, primarily that of Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2001) who provide a general framework to study the problems in
such markets. To get an adequate framework for our analysis we use in their
terminology a setup with heterogeneous consumers, market power, price pre-
commitment and veriﬁability. To get a simple setting with market power
we consider a monopolistic expert.1 Price pre-commitment means that the
expert can commit to a menu of tariﬀs ex ante. Each tariﬀ speciﬁes a list
of repair prices. Consumers observe the menu and then decide whether to
visit the expert. If a consumer decides for a visit, he speciﬁes the tariﬀ under
which he wishes to be served. Now the expert performs a diagnosis and then
provides a treatment and charges for it.
A consumer never discovers the veracity of the diagnosis and he may also
be unable to observe whether the treatment the expert charges for was really
provided. This gives the expert several opportunities to defraud customers.
Two forms of fraud have been the focus of research on credence goods mar-
kets: Recommending and providing an inappropriate treatment and charg-
ing for a more expensive treatment than provided. The former kind of fraud
1The relevant condition is not that a single expert monopolizes the market, but rather
that experts have some degree of market power in providing treatments. In a model in
which capacity is required to serve customers (cf. e.g. Emons 1997 and 2001,R i c h a r d s o n
1999) experts have market power (independently of the number of experts who compete for
customers) whenever tight capacity constraints hamper competition. Similarly, consumer
loyalty, travel costs together with location, search costs, collusion and many, many other
factors might give rise to market power.
2comes in two varieties called by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2001) ’under-
treatment’ (provision of a simple procedure when a high quality intervention
is needed to ﬁx the loss) and ’overtreatment’ (provision of a high quality
repair when a simple one would have been suﬃcient to solve the problem).
The latter kind of fraud is termed by them ’overcharging’. In the present
contribution we concentrate on the two varieties of the former kind of prob-
lem. Overcharging is ruled out in our model by the veriﬁability assumption,
that is, by the assumption that consumers are able to observe and verify the
intervention performed by the expert.
Under veriﬁability an expert’s incentives in performing the diagnosis and
providing a treatment depend upon the type of tariﬀ under which a customer
is served. If the intervention prices speciﬁed by the tariﬀ are such that provid-
ing one of the treatments is more proﬁtable than providing any of the others
then the expert will recommend and provide the most proﬁtable treatment
without a serious diagnosis. Only under equal mark-up tariﬀsw h e r et h ed i f -
ferences in the intervention prices reﬂect the diﬀerences in treatment costs
will the expert perform a serious diagnosis and recommend the appropriate
treatment. Consumers know that; that is, they infer the expert’s incentives
from the intervention prices.
First we analyze a simple setting in which there are only two types of
problem and two types of intervention and in which consumers diﬀer in the
expected cost of eﬃcient treatment. We show that without price discrim-
ination the expert may serve less than the eﬃcient number of consumers
but whoever is served gets eﬃcient diagnosis and appropriate treatment. If
we allow for price discrimination, the number of consumers who get served
increases but only a part of the market gets eﬃcient diagnosis and appropri-
ate treatment. The rest of the consumers is potentially overtreated; that is,
they are induced to buy a high quality treatment without a serious diagnosis.
Regarding welfare, the eﬀect of price discrimination is ambiguous. On the
one hand, price discrimination increases the number of consumers that get
a treatment. On the other hand, some consumers that are eﬃciently served
in the non-discrimination case get the wrong procedure if the expert can
discriminate among customers.
Next we analyze the robustness of our main results. First we extend the
analysis to an arbitrary number of problems and an arbitrary number of
procedures. It turns out that the result that low cost consumers get honest
diagnosis and appropriate treatment while high cost ones are potentially
overtreated extends in this direction. More interesting is another modiﬁcation
3of our basic model. In a setting where consumers diﬀer in their valuation of
a successful intervention we show that price discrimination entails that the
expert provides a serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment only to high
valuation consumers. Low valuation ones are potentially undertreated;t h a t
is, they are induced to demand a low quality intervention without a serious
diagnosis.
The intuition for our over- and undertreatment results is as follows: If
perfect price discrimination were possible, the expert would provide high
quality diagnosis and appropriate treatment to all consumers. This follows
from the observation that consumers infer the expert’s behavior from treat-
ment prices. So the expert cannot gain by cheating. Consequently the best
he can hope for is to appropriate the entire surplus generated by honest be-
havior. Perfect discrimination is impossible. With imperfect discrimination
the expert sells high quality diagnosis and appropriate treatment at a relative
high expected price to the most proﬁtable market segment. For the rest of
the market the eﬃcient diagnosis and treatment policy is unattractive since
the expected price is larger than the valuation of a successful intervention.
Oﬀering eﬃcient diagnosis and treatment at a lower expected price to the
residual demand is impossible because this would induce the more proﬁtable
m a r k e ts e g m e n tt os w i t c ht ot h ec h e a p e rp o l i c y . S o ,t h ee x p e r to ﬀers in
addition to the expensive eﬃcient diagnosis and treatment policy a cheaper
but also less eﬃcient one. This latter policy is designed in such a way that it
attracts the less proﬁtable residual demand while being unattractive for the
rest of the market.
Under heterogeneity in the valuation of a successful intervention the more
proﬁtable market segment is the segment of high valuation consumers. So,
the expert wants to skim oﬀ this segment with the eﬃcient diagnosis and
provision policy and his diﬃculty in designing a second cheaper policy for
the rest of the market is to prevent the high valuation segment from choos-
ing this latter policy. The solution is to potentially undertreat the residual
demand consisting of low valuation consumers; that is, to sell them a low
quality procedure without a serious diagnosis. This undertreatment policy is
unattractive for high valuation consumers because they have more to lose if
t h ep r o c e d u r ef a i l s .
In the diﬀerence in the expected cost setting the more proﬁtable market
segment is the segment of low cost consumers. Thus, this is the segment to
which the expert wants to sell eﬃcient diagnosis and treatment at a relative
high price and his problem in designing a second cheaper policy for the
4rest of the market is to prevent the low cost segment from choosing the
cheaper policy. The solution is to potentially overtreat the residual demand
consisting of high cost consumers; that is, to induce them to demand a high
quality intervention (a new engine) without a serious diagnosis. For low risk
consumers this policy is unattractive since their problem is most likely to
be a minor one, implying that buying the expensive eﬃcient diagnosis and
treatment policy still entails a lower expected cost than buying the high
quality treatment at a bargain price.
Our undertreatment result stands in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings in
another credence goods paper that has the veriﬁability assumption and het-
erogeneous consumers.2 In a model with capacity constrained experts who
provide procedures to consumers who diﬀer in their valuation of a successful
intervention, Richardson (1999) ﬁnds that in equilibrium all treated con-
sumers are potentially overtreated; that is, they get a high quality interven-
tion independently of the outcome of the diagnosis. A closer lock at his paper
reveals that the driving forces behind the Richardson overtreatment and our
undertreatment result diﬀer. Our (over- and undertreatment) results are
driven by the expert’s desire to induce self selection among consumers. By
contrast, Richardson’s ﬁndings result from a lack of price pre-commitment
power. Consider an expert who can ex ante pre-commit only to the price for
a low quality basic intervention. At the diagnosis stage the expert can tell
the consumer that the basic intervention is insuﬃcient to cure his problem
and inform him about the additional amount he would have to pay if he ac-
cepts an upgrade to a more advanced procedure. The customer knows that
he might have a serious problem and that the basic intervention fails in this
case. He is therefore prepared to pay some additional amount for a stronger
treatment. If this amount exceeds the diﬀerence in treatment costs (as it is
the case under Richardson’s assumptions) then the expert has an incentive
to always recommend a stronger treatment even if the basic procedure would
have been suﬃcient to cure the problem.3
Other papers analyze substantially diﬀerent settings. Emons (1987 and
1993) assumes that the type of intervention is veriﬁable and studies the incen-
2To the best of our knowledge there are only two further contributions with heteroge-
neous consumers, one of them is the more verbal paper by Darby and Karni (1973), the
other the 1993 article by Pitchik and Schotter. In both papers heterogeneity is only used
to purify a mixed strategy equilibrium.
3Here, remember that equal mark-ups are necessary to induce an expert to perform a
serious diagnosis and to provide the appropriate treatment.
5tives of experts to under- or overtreat homogeneous consumers. He ﬁnds that
whether the market mechanism induces non-fraudulent behavior depends on
the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the experts’
incentives to be honest. Alger and Salanié (2002) study a homogeneous-
consumer model in which the degree of veriﬁability is a continuous variable.
They identify an equilibrium in which experts defraud consumers in order to
keep them uninformed, as this deters them from seeking a better price else-
where. Pitchik and Schotter (1987 and 1993), Wolinsky (1993 and 1995) and
Taylor (1995) assume that the type of intervention is not veriﬁable and ana-
lyze expert’s temptation to overcharge homogeneous customers. Pesendorfer
and Wolinsky (1999) investigate a model where eﬀort is needed to diagnose
ac o n s u m e ra n dw h e r ea ne x p e r t ’ se ﬀort investment is unobservable. Their
contribution focuses on the eﬀect an additional diagnosis (by a diﬀerent ex-
pert) has on the consumer’s evaluation of a given expert’s eﬀort.
The next section introduces our basic model in which there are only two
t y p e so fp r o b l e ma n dt w ot y p e so fp r o c e d u r e sa n di nw h i c hc o n s u m e r sd i ﬀer
in the expected cost of eﬃcient treatment. In Section 3 we explore the ef-
fects of price discrimination in the basic model. Section 4 discusses several
extensions/modiﬁcations. First, we extend the basic model to allow for an
arbitrary number of problems and arbitrary number of interventions, then
we modify our basic model to a setting where consumers diﬀer not in the
expected cost of eﬃcient treatment but rather in their valuation of a success-
ful intervention, and ﬁnally we look at a setting in which consumers diﬀer
in both dimensions, in their expected cost of eﬃcient treatment and in their
valuation of a successful intervention. Section 5 concludes. Some of the proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 A Basic Model of Credence Goods
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our simple model of credence goods, charac-
terized by their quality (or cost) and the utility they generate for consumers.
Then we specify the market for these goods.
With credence goods, even when consumers can observe the utility they
derive from the goods ex post, they cannot tell whether the quality of the good
or service they received is the ex ante needed one. Furthermore, depending
o nt h ec o n c r e t ef r a m e w o r k ,c o n s u m e r sm a ya l s ob eu n a b l et oo b s e r v ew h i c h
quality they actually received. Thus, with credence goods consumers need to
6trust expert sellers. To refer to examples, consider personal computers. An
expert seller can help to ﬁnd the right quality that ﬁts customers’ needs. A
consumer will not be able to tell whenever he has received a quality that is
too high. Only an inappropriate low quality is detected. Similarly, a car with
an e wm u ﬄer will work as well as with the repair of the old muﬄer when
a repair would have been suﬃcient. The customer cannot tell whether the
new part was really needed. The same problem arises when seeing a doctor:
as long as the patient feels as healthy as he thinks it was possible, he cannot
tell whether he was treated correctly or was overtreated. As in the other
examples, customers are only able to detect too little treatment.
To model this situation, we assume that each consumer (he) has a problem
that needs to be treated. The consumer knows that he has a problem, but
does not know how severe it is. He only knows that he has an ex ante
probability of gk to have a problem of degree k. An expert (she), on the
other hand, is able to detect the severity of the problem by performing a
diagnosis. She can then provide the appropriate treatment and charge for it,
or she can exploit the information asymmetry by defrauding the customer.
In the basic model of Section 3 we assume that there are only two degrees
of problem, a minor (k =1 )and a major (k =2 )one. Each of them can be
treated eﬃciently by exactly one treatment. We denote the type of treatment
that eﬃciently ﬁxes a problem of degree k by ck. The less severe problem is
less costly to be treated. That is, if we denote the cost of the treatment
that eﬃciently ﬁxes a problem of degree k by ck then c1 <c 2.4 The more
expensive treatment ﬁxes either problem, while the cheap one is only good
for the minor problem.5
Table 1 represents the gross utility of a consumer given the type of treat-
m e n th en e e d sa n dt h et y p eh eg e t s .I ft h et y p eo ft r e a t m e n ti ss u ﬃcient, a
consumer gets utility v. O t h e r w i s eh eg e t s0 .T om o t i v a t et h i sp a y o ﬀ struc-
ture consider a car with either a minor problem (car needs oil in the engine)
or a major problem (car needs new engine), with the outcomes being ’car
works’ (if appropriately treated or overtreated) and ’car does not work’ (if
undertreated).6 The credence goods characteristic stems from the fact that
4For convenience, both the type of treatment and the associated cost is denoted by c.
5In Section 4 we extend the basic model to allow for n>2 degrees of problem (k ∈
{1,..,n}). There we assume without loss of generality that, for any k<l ,problem k is
less severe than problem l so that ck <c l. A more expensive treatment ﬁxes all problems
cheaper treatments ﬁx, while the cheapest one is only good for the least severe problem.
6Of course, not all credence goods have such a simple payoﬀ structure. For instance,
7Customer’s utility Customer needs
c1 c2
Customer c1 v 0
gets c2 v v
Table 1: Utility from a Credence Good
the customer is satisﬁed in all cases in the lower triangle. In general, he is
satisﬁed whenever he gets a treatment quality at least as good as the needed
one. In the upper triangle (consisting of a single cell in the basic model
with two degrees of problem and two treatment qualities) he has a more
severe problem than the treatment he gets is able to cure. In this case he
will discover ex post that the treatment he got was not suﬃcient to ﬁxh i s
problem.
As mentioned before, the focus of the credence goods literature has been
twofold: ineﬃcient treatment, either under- or overtreatment, and overcharg-
ing. The ineﬃciency of treatment can be described by referring to Table 1.
The case of undertreatment is the upper right triangle of the table, the case
of overtreatment is the lower left triangle. Note that overtreatment is not
detected by the customer (v = v) and hence cannot be ruled out by institu-
tional arrangements. This is not the case with undertreatment; it is detected
by the customer (0 <v ) and might even be veriﬁable. If this is the case,
a n di fal e g a lr u l ei si ne ﬀect that makes an expert liable for the provision
of inappropriate low quality Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2002) say that the
liability assumption holds. We do not consider this case here, see their article
for an extended discussion of liability.
Referring again to Table 1, the second potential problem is that the cus-
tomer might never receive a signal that discriminates between the cells in the
lower left triangle of the table (the ”v cells”). If this is the case, an expert
who discovers that the customer has the minor problem can charge for the
expensive treatment although she provides only the cheap one. This over-
charging is ruled out if consumers are able to observe and verify the delivered
in the medical example the payoﬀ for an appropriately treated major disease might diﬀer
from that of an appropriately treated minor disease. Similarly, the payoﬀ for a correctly
treated minor disease might diﬀer from that of an overtreated minor disease. Introducing
such diﬀerences would burden the analysis with additional notation, without changing any
of the results, however.
8quality (they know and can prove in which row of the table they are). In this
contribution we assume that consumers have this ability. More precisely, we
impose Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2002)’s shortcut assumption (see Figure
1):7
Assumption V (Veriﬁability) An expert cannot charge for a more expen-
sive treatment if she has provided a cheaper one.
Regarding the magnitude of economies of scope between diagnosis and
treatment there are two diﬀerent scenarios to consider. If these economies are
small, consulting the expert for a diagnosis only may become attractive. With
profound economies of scope, on the other hand, expert and customer are in
eﬀect tied together once the diagnosis is made. In this contribution we assume
large economies of scope. Again, we work with Dulleck and Kerschbamer’s
shortcut assumption:
Assumption C (Commitment) Once a diagnosis is made, the customer
i sc o m m i t t e dt ou n d e r g oat r e a t m e n tb yt h ee x p e r t .
Let us now describe the market environment. There is a single risk neutral
expert in the credence goods market. The expert posts take-it-or-leave-it
tariﬀs. Each tariﬀ speciﬁes the prices for the diﬀerent interventions. Let pk
denote the price posted by the expert for the treatment ck.T h e e x p e r t ’ s
proﬁt is the sum of revenues minus costs over the customers she treated. By
assumption, the expert provides the appropriate treatment if she is indiﬀerent
between providing the appropriate and providing the wrong treatment and
this fact is common knowledge among all players.8
There is a continuum with mass one of risk-neutral consumers in the
market. Each consumer incurs a diagnosis cost d if he visits the expert.9
7The veriﬁability assumption is more plausible in environments where the customer is
physically and mentally present during the treatment than for the alternative case where he
is not. For example, for dental services and minor car- or appliance-repairs this assumption
is likely to be appropriate, whereas for more sophisticated repairs (where the customer is
unlikely to wait for the repair to be performed in his sight) and surgery (where the patient
is often under anaesthetic during the treatment) it is not.
8Introducing some guilt disutility associated with providing the wrong treatment would
yield the same qualitative results as this common knowledge assumption provided the eﬀect
is small enough to not outweigh the pecuniary incentives.
9Provision of treatment without diagnosis is assumed to be impossible. The diagnosis
cost d is assumed to include the time and eﬀort cost incurred by the consumer in visiting
a doctor, taking the car to a mechanic, etc. It is also assumed to include a fair diagnosis
fee paid to the expert to cover her opportunity cost.
9The net payoﬀ of a consumer who has been treated is his gross valuation as
depicted in Table 1 minus the price paid for the treatment minus diagnosis
cost. The payoﬀ of a consumer who has not been treated is his reservation
payoﬀ, which we normalize to equal zero.10 By assumption, it is always (i.e.,
even ex post)e ﬃcient that a consumer is treated when he has a problem.
That is, v − c2 − d>0. Also, by assumption, if a consumer is indiﬀerent
between visiting the expert and not visiting the expert, he decides for a visit.
To analyze the eﬀects of price discrimination we need heterogeneous con-
sumers. Consumers might diﬀer in several dimensions, for instance in their
”risk” of having diﬀerent degrees of problem and/or in their valuation of a
successful intervention v. I nt h eb a s i cm o d e lo fS e c t i o n3w ea s s u m et h a t
consumers diﬀer only in their probabilities of needing diﬀerent treatments.
More precisely, we assume that each consumer is characterized by his type t
and that a consumer of type t has the major problem with probability gt
2 = t
and the minor one with probability gt
1 =1− t. Consumers’ types are drawn
independently from the same concave distribution F (·),w i t hd i ﬀerentiable
strictly positive density f (·) on [0,1]. F (·) is common knowledge, but a
consumer’s type is the consumer’s private information.11 For further use, we




kck + d = c1 + t(c2 − c1)+d.
For the considered time and information structure we refer to Figure 1.
This ﬁgure shows the game tree for the special case where the monopolistic
expert courts a single consumer whose type is known with certainty. The
variables v, g1,g 2,c 1 and c2 are assumed to be common knowledge. At the
outset the expert posts tariﬀs specifying treatment prices p1 and p2 for c1
and c2, respectively. In the special case covered by the ﬁgure the expert
posts a single tariﬀ only. With heterogeneous consumers the expert might
want to post a menu of tariﬀs. The consumer observes the tariﬀsa n dt h e n
decides whether to visit the expert or not. If he decides against the visit, he
10Here, the implicit assumption is that the outside option is not to be treated at all.
Again, the car example provides a good illustration. A car may be inoperable for a
minor or a major reason, with the lack of treatment giving the same outcome (’car does
not work’) as undertreatment. The medical example behaves diﬀerently. For instance,
l e t t i n gac a n c e r o u sg r o w t hg ou n t r e a t e di sm u c hd i ﬀerent than letting a benign growth go
untreated. See Footnote 6 above, however.
11Car owners know how they treat their vehicles and the associated risk of needing
certain repairs, auto mechanics know only the distribution. Similarly, patients know their
eating and smocking habits and the associated risk of getting certain diseases, doctors
only the distribution.
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Figure 1: Game Tree for the Basic Model (t = t for all consumers, say)
remains untreated yielding a payoﬀ of zero for both players. If he decides for
a visit, he speciﬁes the tariﬀ under which he wants to be treated.12 Then a
random move of nature determines the severity of his problem.13 Now the
expert diagnoses the consumer. In the course of her diagnosis she learns the
customer’s problem, then she provides a treatment and charges for it. The
game ends with payoﬀs determined in the obvious way. The extensive form
for our model with a continuum of heterogeneous consumers and with a menu
of tariﬀs can be constructed from this game tree in the usual way.
This is the basic setup of our credence goods game. In Section 3 we
analyze monopolistic price discrimination in this basic model. In Section 4
we extend the model to allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an
a r b i t r a r yn u m b e ro ft r e a t m e n t s . T h e r ew ea l s oa n a l y z et h es e t t i n gw h e r e
consumers diﬀer in their valuation for a successful intervention.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation: A tariﬀ (p1,p 2)
implies incentives it provides for the expert to perform diagnosis and to
12This move is absent in the ﬁgure where the expert posts a single tariﬀ only.
13Here note that, from a game-theoretic point of view, there is no diﬀerence between a
model in which nature determines the severity of the problem at the outset and our model
where this move occurs after the consumer has consulted an expert (but before the expert
has performed the diagnosis).
11provide treatment. Three classes of tariﬀs are to be distinguished, tariﬀst h a t
contain a higher mark-up for the expensive treatment (p2 − c2 >p 1 − c1),
tariﬀs that have a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment (p2−c2 <p 1−c1),
and tariﬀs with equal mark-ups (p2 − c2 = p1 − c1). We denote tariﬀsi nt h e
ﬁrst class by ∆02, tariﬀsi nt h es e c o n db y∆10, and tariﬀsi nt h et h i r db y
∆12. As will become clear below, only under tariﬀsw h e r et h ed i ﬀerences in
the intervention prices reﬂect the diﬀerences in treatment costs (equal mark-
up tariﬀs) will the expert perform a serious diagnosis and recommend the
appropriate treatment. Under tariﬀs where the intervention prices depart
from the equal mark-up rule the expert will recommend and provide the
most proﬁtable treatment without a serious diagnosis. That is, the expert
will perform a honest diagnosis and provide the appropriate treatment under
a ∆02 tariﬀ, she will always recommend and provide the cheap treatment
independently of the outcome of the diagnosis under a ∆10 contract and she
will always recommend and provide the expensive treatment independently
of the outcome of the diagnosis under a ∆20 contract.14 For convenience we
will often denote not only a speciﬁct a r i ﬀ but also the implied mark-up by
∆ij.T h a ti s ,t h et e r m∆ij will then stand for the mark-up on the treatment
that is provided under the respective contract (∆ij =m a x {p1 −c1,p 2 −c2}).
3 Price Discrimination in the Basic Model:
Overtreatment
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of price discrimination in our basic
model. Before beginning we present a benchmark result for a setting in
which the expert cannot price discriminate among consumers. Without price
discrimination the expert chooses equal mark-up prices and serves her cus-
tomers honestly. If the diﬀerence in the expected cost between the best and
the worst type is small relative to the eﬃciency gain of treating the worst
type then the expert serves all consumers. Otherwise prices are such that
some consumers do not consult her even though serving them would be ef-
ﬁcient. This is nothing but the familiar monopoly-pricing ineﬃciency: The
monopolistic expert would like to appropriate as much of the net gain from
treatment as possible but, because of heterogeneous consumers, she puts up
with the risk of losing some consumers in order to get a higher price from
14We use the terms tariﬀ, price-vector and contract interchangeably.
12the remaining ones. We record the monopoly pricing result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
consumers who diﬀer in their probabilities of needing diﬀerent treatments
only. Suppose the monopolistic expert cannot price-discriminate among cus-
tomers. Then, in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the expert posts
and charges equal mark-up prices (pk −ck = ∆ for k =1 ,2). If the diﬀerence
in expected cost between the best and the worst type is large relative to the
eﬃciency gain of treating the worst type (c2−c1 >v−d−c2) then prices are
such that high cost consumers decide to remain untreated (∆ >v− Ct for
t strictly higher than some t ∈ (0,1)), while all other types visit the expert
(∆ ≤ v − Ct for t ≤ t) and get serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment.
Otherwise all consumers are eﬃciently served under equal mark-up prices
(∆ ≤ v − Ct for all t)
Proof. First note that with veriﬁability the expert will always charge for
the treatment she provided. The treatment quality provided depends upon
the type of tariﬀ under which the customer is served. A customer under a
∆02 contract will always get the expensive, a customer under ∆10 always the
cheap treatment. Only under ∆12 the expert is indiﬀerent between the two
types of treatment and, therefore, behaves honestly.15
Consumers infer the expert’s incentives from treatment prices. The max-
imal proﬁt the monopolist can realize form serving a type t consumer with
equal mark-up prices is therefore v − Ct. The maximal obtainable proﬁt
with ∆02 tariﬀsi sv − Ct −gt
1(c2 − c1), and the maximal proﬁtw i t h∆10
tariﬀsi sv − Ct −gt
2(v − c2 + c1).T h u s , s i n c e v>c 2 − c1,t h ee x p e r t
will post an equal mark-up tariﬀ and she will provide the appropriate treat-
ment to all of her customers. With equal mark-ups the monopolistic ex-
pert is interested in two variables only, in the magnitude of the mark-up
∆ = ∆12 and in the number of visiting consumers. The result then follows
15The assumption that it is common knowledge among players that the expert provides
the appropriate treatment whenever she is indiﬀerent plays an important role in Propo-
sition 1 in generating a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Without this assumption
there exist other subgame-perfect equilibria which are supported by the belief that the
expert deliberately mistreats her customers under each equal mark-up vector - or, that
the expert deliberately mistreats her customers under equal mark-up prices that are too
high. We regard such equilibria as implausible (see Footnote 8 above) and have therefore
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Figure 2: Type t’s Expected Utility under Diﬀerent Price Vectors
from the observation that the expert’s problem is nothing but the familiar
monopoly pricing problem for revenue per customer ∆ and demand curve
D(∆)=F[(v − d − c1 − ∆)/(c2 − c1)].16
The equal mark-up result is readily illustrated graphically. First notice
that under veriﬁability the expert’s incentives in performing the diagnosis
and in providing a treatment depend upon the type of tariﬀ under which
a customer is served. If the intervention prices speciﬁed by the tariﬀ are
such that providing one of the treatments is more proﬁtable than providing
the other then the expert will recommend and provide the more proﬁtable
treatment without a serious diagnosis. So, if we ﬁx the mark-up for the
cheaper intervention at p1 − c1 and increase the mark-up for the expensive
intervention from 0 (as it is done in Figure 2) then the expert’s incentives
remain unchanged over the interval (0,p 1 − c1): she will always recommend
and provide the cheap treatment at the price p1 = c1 + ∆10. Consequently,
the expected utility of a consumer of type t is constant in this interval at
v−Ct−t(v−c2+c1)−∆10, where the term t(v−c2+c1) reﬂects the eﬃciency
loss from undertreatment. Similarly, if we start at p1−c1 and increase p2−c2
16That the condition (c2 −c1) >v− d − c2 is suﬃcient for an interior solution is easily
veriﬁed by ﬁrst solving the linear case (where F(.) is the uniform distribution) and then
noting that the mark-up cannot be lower if F(.) is strictly concave rather than linear.
14then the expert will always recommend and provide the expensive treatment
at the price p2 = c2 + ∆02. So, the consumer’s utility in this segment is
v − Ct − (1 − t)(c2 − c1) − ∆02, where the term (1 − t)(c2 − c1) reﬂects the
eﬃciency loss from overtreatment. Only at the single point p2−c2 = p1−c1 =
∆12 where the diﬀerence in the intervention prices reﬂects the diﬀerence in
treatment costs will the expert perform a serious diagnosis and recommend
the appropriate treatment. So, at this point there is no eﬃciency loss and
type t0s expected utility jumps discontinuously upward to v − Ct − ∆12.
Consumers infer the expert’s incentives from the intervention prices. So the
expert cannot gain by cheating. Consequently, the best she can do is to post
an equal mark-up tariﬀ and to behave honestly.
Equal mark-up prices are common in important credence goods markets,
including dental services, automobile and equipment repair and pest control.
Equal mark-up prices are also often seen in case of expert sellers. Computer
stores are an obvious example. Customers can control which quality they
receive. Other examples are pricing schemes of insurance brokers and travel
agents. The mark-up insurance brokers and travels agents charge (the margin
plus any bonuses oﬀered by the provider) is similar for all products.
For our next result we allow the expert to (second degree) price discrimi-
nate among consumers. That is, we let the monopolistic expert post a menu
of tariﬀs; consumers observe the menu and then decide under which contract,
if any, they wish to be served.
Under standard conditions, second degree discriminatory pricing reduces
the monopoly-pricing ineﬃciency. As the following result shows, a new inef-
ﬁciency appears in the present model with credence goods.
Proposition 2 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
consumers who diﬀer in their probabilities of needing diﬀerent treatment only.
Suppose that the expert can price discriminate among consumers (rather than
being restricted to post a single tariﬀ only). Then, in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium, the expert posts two tariﬀs, one with equal mark-ups, and one
with a higher mark-up for the expensive treatment.17 Both tariﬀs attract cus-
tomers and in total all consumers are served. Low cost consumers are served
under the former tariﬀ and always get honest diagnosis and appropriate treat-
ment; high cost consumers are served under the latter and always get the
expensive treatment, sometimes ineﬃciently.
17The menu may contain some redundant tariﬀs too, i.e., some tariﬀs that attract no
consumers.
15Proof. The proof proceeds in four steps. In Step 1 we ﬁrst show that
any arbitrary menu of tariﬀs partitions the type-set into (at most) three
subintervals delimited by cut-oﬀ values t10,t 12 and t02 with 0 ≤ t10 ≤ t12 ≤
t02 ≤ 1 and either t12 = t02 or t02 =1(or both) such that (i) the optimal
strategy of types in [0,t 10) is to choose a ∆10 tariﬀ, (ii) the optimal strategy
of types in [t10,t 12] is to decide for a ∆12 tariﬀ, and (iii) the optimal strategy
of types in (t12,1] is either to choose a ∆02 tariﬀ (t02 =1 ), or to remain
untreated (t12 = t02).18 Our strategy is then to show in Step 2 that an
optimal price-discriminating menu cannot have t10 = t12 (that is, there must
be an equal mark-up tariﬀ which attracts a strictly positive measure of types),
to show next (in Step 3)t h a tt10 =0whenever t10 <t 12 (that is, the expert
has never an incentive to post a menu where both an equal mark-up tariﬀ
and a tariﬀ with a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment attract types),
a n dt os h o wi nt h ee n d( Step 4) that the expert has indeed always a strict
incentive to cover a strictly positive interval by a tariﬀ with a higher mark-up
for the expensive treatment (t12 <t 02 =1 ).
Step 1 First note that any arbitrary menu of tariﬀsc a nb er e p r e s e n t e d
by (at most) three variables, by the lowest ∆02 = p2 − c2 from the class of
∆02 tariﬀs (we denote the lowest ∆02 in this class by ∆l
02), by the lowest
∆10 = p1 − c1 from the class of ∆10 tariﬀs (we denote the lowest ∆10 in this
class by ∆l
10), and by the lowest equal mark-up ∆12 from the class of all
equal mark-up tariﬀs in the menu (denoted by ∆l
12).19 To see this, note that
with n =2each possible price vector is member of exactly one of these three
classes, and that a customer who decides for a vector in a given class will
always decide for the one with the lowest ∆.20 An immediate implication is
that each menu of tariﬀs partitions the type-set into the above mentioned
18The borderline types t10 and t12 are indiﬀerent between the strategies of the types
in the adjacent intervals (whenever such intervals exist). Here note that we allow for
t12 =1(all consumers are served and no consumer chooses a ∆02 tariﬀ), for t10 = t12 (no
consumer is attracted by a ∆12 tariﬀ), and for t10 =0(no consumer is attracted by a ∆10
tariﬀ). Price discrimination requires, however, that at least two of the three relations hold
as strict inequalities.
19An immediate implication of this observation is that successful price discrimination
requires that some types are mistreated with strictly positive probability. Why? Since at
least two tariﬀs must attract a positive measure of consumers and since only one of them
c a nb ea ne q u a lm a r k - u pt a r i ﬀ.
20Under a ∆02 tariﬀ neither the consumer nor the expert cares about the associated p1.
All tariﬀs in the group that have the same ∆02 can therefore be thought oﬀ as being a
single tariﬀ without any loss in generality. The argument for ∆10 tariﬀs is symmetric.
16three subintervals. This follows from the fact that the expected utility under
∆l
02 is type-independent (implying that either t12 = t02 or t02 =1or both),
while the expected utility under both the ∆l
12 tariﬀ and the ∆l
10 tariﬀ is
strictly decreasing in t,a n df r o mv>c 2−c1 (implying that the ∆l
10-function
is steeper than the ∆l
12-function).
Step 2 To see that t10 <t 12, suppose to the contrary that t10 = t12.
Then t10 > 0,s i n c et10 = t12 =0is incompatible with price-discrimination
(and since - by Proposition 1 - a non-price-discriminating expert will always
decide for a ∆12 vector). But such a menu is strictly dominated, since the
∆l




2 (v − c2 + c1); the latter attracts exactly the same types as the
replaced one and yields a strictly higher proﬁt.
Step 3 To see that t10 =0whenever t10 <t 12, suppose to the contrary
that 0 <t 10 <t 12. Then the expert’s proﬁt is strictly increased by removing
all ∆10 vectors from the menu. This follows from the observation that (by
the monotonicity of the expected utility − in t − under ∆12)a l lt y p e si n
[0,t 10) switch to ∆l
12 when all ∆10 vectors are removed from the menu, and
from the fact that the expected proﬁt per customer is strictly higher under
∆l
12 than under ∆l
10 whenever 0 <t 10 <t 12,s i n c e∆l
12 ≤ ∆l
10 is incompatible
with the shape of expected utilities (∆l
12 ≤ ∆l
10 implies that v − Ct − ∆l
12 >
v − Ct − ∆l
10 − gt
2(v − c2 + c1) for all t>0 contradicting t10 > 0).Thus,
t10 =0<t 12 ≤ t02 ≤ 1. So, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium
it is performed via a menu that contains two tariﬀs, one with equal mark-ups,
and one with a higher mark-up for the more expensive treatment.21
Step 4 We now show that the expert has always a strict incentive to
post such a menu. Consider the equal mark-up vector posted by the expert
under the conditions of Proposition 1. The mark-up in this vector is at least
∆12 = v − d − c2, in an interior solution even higher. First suppose that
the monopolist’s maximization problem under the conditions of Proposition
1 yields an interior solution (i.e., ∆12 >v− d − c2). Then the expert can
increase her proﬁtb yp o s t i n gam e n uc o n s i s t i n go ft w ov e c t o r s ,t h eo n e
chosen under the conditions of Proposition 1 and a ∆02 vector with p2 =
v − d. The latter vector guarantees each type an expected utility equal to
the reservation utility of 0. Thus, all types that remain untreated under the
conditions of Proposition 1 will opt for it since they are indiﬀerent. Also,
21The menue might contain some redundant vectors too, which can safely be ignored,
however.
17all types served under the conditions of Proposition 1 still choose the equal
mark-up vector since v − Ct is strictly decreasing in t. Hence, since v −
d>c 2,a n ds i n c ea l lt y p e si n[0,1] have strictly positive probability, the
expert’s expected proﬁti si n c r e a s e d . 22 Now suppose that the monopolist’s
maximization problem under the conditions of Proposition 1 yields the corner
solution ∆12 = v−d−c2. Then again the monopolist can increase her proﬁt
b ypo s t i n gam e n uc o n s i s t i n go ft w ot a r i ﬀs, a ∆02 contract with p2 = v−d, and
a ∆12 contract that maximizes π(∆12)=∆12F[(v−d−c1−∆12)/(c2−c1)]+
(v − d − c2)(1 − F[(v − d − c1 − ∆12)/(c2 − c1)]). Since π(∆12) is strictly
increasing in ∆12 at ∆12 = v − d − c2 an interior solution is guaranteed.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2 the expert posts two tariﬀs, one
with equal mark-ups to skim-oﬀ low cost consumers and a less proﬁtable
tariﬀ with a higher mark-up for the more expensive treatment to serve the
rest. Consumers served under the former tariﬀ get honest diagnosis and
appropriate treatment, consumers served under the latter always get the
expensive treatment, sometimes ineﬃciently.
Figure 3 illustrates the result. This ﬁgure shows how consumers’ expected
utility under diﬀerent tariﬀsv a r i e si nt h et y p e .F i r s tn o t i c et h a tc o n s u m e r s ’
expected utility under ∆02 (where the expert always provides the expensive
intervention) is type-independent, while the expected utility under both the
∆12 tariﬀ (where the expert behaves honestly) and the ∆10 tariﬀ (where the
expert undertreats the customer) is strictly decreasing in t. Next notice that
the ∆10-function is strictly steeper than the ∆21-function. This follows from
the observation that under ∆10 higher types have a higher probability that
the intervention fails (leading to a loss of v) while under ∆21 they have only a
higher probability to get charged for the more expensive treatment (leading
to an additional cost of c2 − c1 <v ). Finally remember from the discussion
of Figure 2 that if a ∆10 tariﬀ,a∆12 tariﬀ and a ∆02 tariﬀ simultaneously
attract customers (as it is the case in the situation depicted in Figure 3)
then the ineﬃcient tariﬀs ∆10 and ∆02 must have lower mark-ups than the
eﬃcient one. Consequently, a situation as depicted in Figure 3 can never arise
22Here note that the expert can do even better by increasing ∆l
12. This follows from the
observation that the expert’s trade-oﬀ under the conditions of Proposition 1 is between
increasing the mark-up charged from the types in the segment of served customers and
losing some types to the unproﬁtable segment of not served consumers, while the trade-
oﬀ here is between increasing the mark-up charged from the types in the segment of
customers served under the more proﬁtable equal mark-up vector and losing some types








v − d − c1 − ∆10
v − d − c1 − ∆12
v − d − c2 − ∆02


















expected utility under ∆10
expected utility under ∆12
expected utility under ∆02






Figure 3: Type Dependent Expected Utilities with Ct = c1 + t(c2 − c1)+d
in equilibrium: the expert could always remove the ∆10 tariﬀ from the menu;
then all types in [0,t 10) w o u l ds w i t c ht o∆12 and the expert’s proﬁtw o u l d
be increased. Also, a menu where only a ∆10 tariﬀ and ∆02 tariﬀ attract
types can never be an equilibrium menu: the expert could always replace
the ∆10 tariﬀ by an eﬃcient tariﬀ such that the highest type attracted by
∆10 is exactly indiﬀerent between ∆10 and ∆10; the ∆12 tariﬀ would attract
exactly the same types as the replaced ∆10 contract and yield a strictly higher
proﬁt. So, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium it is performed
v i aam e n ut h a tc o n t a i n st w ot a r i ﬀs, one with equal mark-ups, and one with
a higher mark-up for the more expensive treatment.
That the expert has indeed always an incentive to post such a menu is
easily seen. First suppose that some consumers are remain unserved under
the conditions of Proposition 1. Then the expert can increase her proﬁtb y
posting a menu consisting of two vectors, the one chosen under the conditions
of Proposition 1 and a ∆02 tariﬀ that leaves zero rents to consumers (p2 =
v − d). Since v − d>c 2, and since all types in [0,1] have strictly positive
probability, the expert’s expected proﬁt is increased. Next suppose that
the expert’s maximization problem under the conditions of Proposition 1
19yields the corner solution ∆12 = v − d − c2. Then again she can increase
her proﬁtb yp o s t i n gam e n uc o n s i s t i n go ft w ot a r i ﬀs, a ∆02 contract with
∆02 = v − d − c2, a n da ne ﬃcient tariﬀ with ∆12 = v − d − c2 + ε.S t i l la l l
consumers are served. Those served under ∆02 leave the expert with exactly
the same proﬁt as before, those served under ∆12 are served more proﬁtable.
Hence, the expert’s proﬁt is again increased.
Producers selling their goods through diﬀerent distribution channels are
examples for second degree discriminatory simultaneously attract customers
pricing. For instance, many PC manufacturers distribute their computers
through IT warehouses that oﬀer only one quality of equipment at a relatively
low price, and through specialized dealers that oﬀe rt h ee n t i r ea s s o r t m e n ta s
well as advice on choosing the right quality.
T h ee q u a lm a r k - u pi nt h et a r i ﬀ posted under the conditions of Proposi-
tion 2 is strictly higher than that in the tariﬀ of Proposition 1. This follows
from the observation that the expert’s trade-oﬀ is between increasing the
mark-up charged from the types in the segment of served customers and
losing some types to the unproﬁtable segment of not served consumers in
the latter case, while the trade-oﬀ here is between increasing the mark-up
charged from the types served under the more proﬁtable equal mark-up vec-
tor and losing some types to the segment of customers served under the less
proﬁtable second vector. So, some consumers who always get honest diag-
nosis and appropriate treatment under the conditions of Proposition 1,g e t
(with strictly positive probability) the wrong treatment when the expert can
price discriminate among consumers. So, if the diﬀerence in expected cost
between the best and the worst type is fairly small (so that the monopolist
serves all consumers if she is not allowed to price discriminate) then allowing
discrimination unambiguously reduces eﬃciency. On the other hand, when
some consumers are excluded under the conditions of Proposition 1,t h e n
there is a trade-oﬀ between increasing the number of treated consumers and
serving the treated customers eﬃciently. Overall eﬃciency might increase or
decrease with price discrimination depending on the shape of the distribution
function F (·), the valuation v (net of diagnosis costs d,o fc o u r s e )a n dt h e
cost diﬀerential c2 − c1. As our next result shows, the mass of consumers
that are eﬃciently served under non-discrimination and ineﬃciently under
discrimination increases in the net valuation v − d and decreases in the cost
diﬀerential c2 − c1. At the same time, the mass of consumers that are not
served under non-discrimination and served under discrimination decreases
in the net valuation and increases in the cost diﬀerential. So, price discrimi-
20nation is ceteris paribus more likely to be eﬃciency enhancing if consumers’
valuation of an eﬃcient treatment is small and if the cost diﬀerential is large.
Proposition 3 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
with consumers who diﬀer in their probabilities of needing diﬀerent inter-
ventions only. Let 1 − F(ta
12) stand for the mass of consumers that are
not served under non-discrimination and served under discrimination. Sim-
ilarly, let F(ta
12)− F(tb
12) stand for the mass of consumers that are eﬃ-
ciently served under non-discrimination and ineﬃciently under discrimina-
tion. Then 1−F(ta
12) is increasing in (c2 −c1) and decreasing in v −d while
F(ta
12)− F(tb
12) is decreasing in (c2 − c1) and increasing in v − d .
Proof. Under the conditions of Proposition 1 the monopolist maximizes
π(∆12)=∆12F[(v − d − c1 − ∆12)/(c2 − c1)]. If this problem has an interior
solution ∆a
12 then it satisﬁes ∆a
12/(c2 − c1)=F[(v − d − c1 − ∆a
12)/(c2 − c1)]
/f[(v − d − c1 − ∆a
12)/(c2 − c1)], where f(.) stands for the density function
associated with F(.). Furthermore, if there is an interior solution, then there
exists a critical type ta
12 ∈ (0,1) such that consumers decide to remain un-
treated for t strictly higher than ta
12 and visit the expert for t lower than ta
12.
This critical type is given by ta
12 =( v − d − c1 − ∆a
12)/(c2 − c1). What we
need to show in a ﬁr s ts t e pi st h a t( a )1 − F(ta
12) is decreasing in v − d and
increasing in (c2 − c1).
Under the conditions of Proposition 2 the monopolist maximizes π(∆12)=
∆12F[(v−d−c1−∆12)/(c2−c1)] + (v−d−c2)(1−F[(v−d−c1−∆12)/(c2−c1)]).
The solution of this problem satisﬁes ∆b
12/(c2−c1)=F[(v−d−c1−∆b
12)/(c2−
c1)]/f[(v − d − c1 − ∆b




02 = v − c2 − d, consumers choose ∆b
12 for
t lower than tb
12 =( v − d−c1 −∆b
12)/(c2 −c1) and ∆b
02 for t higher than tb
12.
What we need to show next is that (b) F(ta
12)− F(tb
12) is increasing in v − d
and decreasing in (c2 − c1).
To show (a) and (b) we simplify the notation as follows: We use the
variable c for the diﬀerence c2−c1, the variable e v for the diﬀerence v−d−c1
and the function H(.) for the quotient F(.)/f(.). With this notation the
implicit formula which determines ta
12 and tb
12 is given by G(e v,c,k)=1−
H(t12(e v,c,k)) + k(e v/c − 1) − t12(e v,c,k)=0 , where k =1for ta
12 (ta
12 =
t12(e v,c,1))a n dk =0for tb
12 (tb
12 = t12(e v,c,0)). Given the deﬁnition of
H(.) and the assumption that F(.) is concave it follows that H(.) > 0 and
H0(.) > 0. Using this and applying the implicit function theorem, we ﬁnd
21that ∂ta
12/∂(v − d)=∂t12(e v,c,1)/∂e v =1 /c(1 + H0(.)) > 0,∂ t b
12/∂(v − d)=
∂t12(e v,c,0)/∂e v =0 ,∂ t a
12/∂(c2−c1)=∂t12(e v,c,1)/∂c = −e v/c2(1+H0(.)) < 0
and ∂tb
12/∂(c2 − c1)=∂t12(e v,c,0)/∂c =0 . Thus, since F 0(.) > 0 the result
follows.
The following examples illustrates the result:
Example: Suppose the distribution function F(.) is given by F(x)=x1/y
for y =1 ,2,... Then ∆a
12 = y(v −d−c1)/(y +1), ∆b
12 =[ y(v −d−c1)+(v −
d − c2)]/(y +1 ) ,t a
12 =( v − d − c1)/[(y +1 ) ( c2 − c1)], tb
12 =1 /(y +1 ) , and
ta
12− tb
12 =( v −d−c2)/[(y +1)(c2 −c1)]. So, if v =1 0 ,c 2 =5 ,c 1 =2 ,d=2 ,
and y =1(implying that F(.) is the uniform distribution) then the non-
price-discriminating expert will serve all consumers eﬃciently under the equal
mark-up tariﬀ ∆a
1,2 =3( ta
12 =1 ) . If she is allowed to price-discriminate then
she serves half of the population under the equal mark-up vector ∆b
1,2 =4 .5
(tb
12 =0 .5), and the rest under the ’overtreatment tariﬀ’ ∆b
0,2 =3 .23 So, with
this parameter constellation welfare is deﬁnitely decreasing when moving
from non-discrimination to discrimination because under nondiscrimination
all consumers are treated eﬃciently (Wa =4 .5) whereas with discrimina-
tion customers in the interval t ∈ (0.5,1] are potentially overtreated, i.e.,
they receive with probability (1 − t) an unnecessary expensive treatment
(Wb =4 .125). If c2 increases from 5 to 7 then the non-price-discriminating
expert serves 60% of the consumers eﬃciently (ta
12 =6 /10) and the rest
remains unserved. With this constellation welfare is higher under discrim-
ination (Wb =2 .875) than under non-discrimination (W a =2 .7)b e c a u s e
the gain of customers not treated under non-discrimination (those in the in-
terval (0.6,1]) outweights the loss of consumers that are eﬃciently served
under non-discrimination and ineﬃciently under discrimination (those in the
interval (0.5,0.6]).24 Similarly, if we start from the same starting point and
reduce v − d from 8 to 6 then the non-price-discriminating expert serves
66% of the consumers eﬃciently (ta
12 =2 /3) and the rest remains unserved.
Again, welfare is higher under discrimination (W b =2 .125) than under non-
23Note that ∆a
12 = ∆b
02 is due to the fact hat gt
2 has full support on [0,1] and that
parameters are such that all consumers are treated under non-discrimination. Whenever
some customers remain untreated under non-discrimination, mark-ups diﬀer. Also, if gt
2
< 1 for all t then ∆a
12 6= ∆b
02.
24Here note that the eﬃciency gain of treating a type t consumer under ∆12 is v − Ct,
while the eﬃciency gain of (over-)treating a type t customer under ∆02 is v − Ct − (1 −
t)(c2 − c1).
22discrimination (Wa =2 ).
4E x t e n s i o n s / M o d i ﬁcations
In this section we discuss several extensions/modiﬁcations. First, we ex-
tend the basic model to allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an
arbitrary number of interventions. It turns out that our main result that
price discrimination entails potential overtreatment of high cost consumers
extends in this direction. Next we modify our basic model to a setting where
consumers diﬀer not in the expected cost of eﬃcient treatment but rather
in their valuation for a successful intervention. We show that in this setting
the expert provides serious diagnosis and appropriate treatment only to high
valuation consumers while low valuation ones are potentially undertreated;
that is, they are induced to demand a simple procedure without a serious
diagnosis. Finally we look at a setting in which consumers diﬀer in both di-
mensions, in their expected cost of eﬃcient treatment and in their valuation
of a successful intervention. It turns out that the expert will always serve at
least some consumers eﬃciently. The rest may get unnecessary or insuﬃcient
procedures or no treatment at all.
4.1 More than Two Degrees of Problem: Diﬀerent De-
grees of Overtreatment
In this subsection we extend our analysis to n>2 degrees of problem
(k ∈ {1,..,n}). We denote the type of procedure that eﬃciently ﬁxes a prob-
lem of degree k by ck. Without loss of generality we assume that if k<lthen
problem k is less severe than problem l.A g a i nw ea s s u m et h a tal e s ss e v e r e
problem is less costly to be treated (ck <c l for k<l ) and that a more expen-
sive treatment ﬁxes all problems cheaper treatments ﬁx, while the cheapest
one is only good for the least severe problem. As in the basic model each
consumer is characterized by his type t and a type t consumer has probabil-
ity gt
k = gt(ck) ≥ 0 of needing treatment ck, with
Pn
k=1 gt
k =1 . Let Gt(.) be
the associated cumulative distribution function, i.e., Gt(cl)=
Pl
k=1 gt(ck).
Also, let Ct denote the associated expected cost of eﬃcient treatment net
of diagnosis cost, i.e., Ct =
Pn
k=1 gt
kck + d. For the formal analysis we need
some structure on the type set. What we want to have is (i) a continuum of
types, (ii) for each type t a strictly positive probability of having a problem
23of degree k (= 1,....,n), a n d( i i i )a no r d e r i n go nt h et y p es e ts u c ht h a tf o r
any two types s and t with s ≤ t the probability of having a problem of
at least degree k is higher under Gt(.) than under Gs(.) for every degree of
problem. A simple way to get such a structure is to take two distributions
G1(.) and G0(.) with (densities g1(.) and g0(.) that have) full support on
{c1,...,cn} such that the former ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the lat-
ter (i.e., 1 − G1(.) > 1 − G0(.) for all ck, or equivalently G1(.) <G 0(.) for
all ck), and to let the cumulative distribution of problem degrees for a type
t consumer be given by Gt(.)=( 1−t)G0(.)+tG1(.). In the sequel we follow
this way and assume that consumers’ types are drawn independently from
the same distribution F (·),w i t hd i ﬀerentiable strictly positive density f (·)
on [0,1].A g a i n ,F (·) is assumed to be common knowledge, but a consumer’s
type is the consumer’s private information.
In an n ≥ 2 framework there are 2n − 1 classes of tariﬀst oc o n s i d e r ,t h e
class of equal mark-up tariﬀs (denoted by ∆1,2,...,n−1,n)a n d2n − 2 classes
of tariﬀs that have a lower mark-up for at least one and at most n − 1
treatments. We denote tariﬀs that have a lower mark-up for treatment k
by ∆1,..,k−1,0,k+1,...,n.25 For instance, for n =3 , a ∆103 vector has p1 − c1 =
p3 − c3 >p 2 − c2. Similarly, for n =4 , a ∆0004 tariﬀ has p4 − c4 >p k − ck
for k =1 ,2,3. The expert’s behavior under the n classes of ∆0,..,0,k,0,..,0 tar-
iﬀs and under ∆1,2,...,n−1,n is obvious. She will always provide treatment k
under tariﬀs in the former classes, and she will always provide the appropri-
ate treatment under tariﬀs in the latter class. What about the rest? Our
assumption that the expert acts in her customers’ interest whenever she is
indiﬀerent implies that she uses the cheapest highest mark-up treatment that
ﬁxes the problem whenever such a treatment exists. If none of the highest
mark-up treatments ﬁxes the problem, then the expert provides the cheapest
highest mark-up treatment. For instance, under ∆0,..,0,k,0,..,0,l,0,..0 the expert
will provide procedure ck for problem degrees h ≤ k, procedure cl for problem
degrees h ∈ {k +1 ,..,l}, and again procedure k for problem degrees h>l .
Given these speciﬁcations the net utilities of consumers under all possible
tariﬀsa r ew e l ld e ﬁned and we can try to extend the arguments for the n =2
to the n>2 case. As is easily veriﬁed, Proposition 1 continues to hold
if we replace the condition c2 − c1 >v− d − c2 by C1 − C0 >v− C1:
25Note the slight change in the ∆-notation: When we consider an arbitrary number n of
problems we insert commas between the diﬀerent treatments to avoid confusion; that is, we
write ∆1,2,...,n−1,n instead of ∆12...n−1n and ∆1,..,k−1,0,k+1,...,n instead of ∆1...k−10k+1...n.
24if the diﬀerence between the ’best’ and the ’worst’ type is large relative to
the eﬃciency gain of treating the worst type then the non-discriminating
expert will again demand prices such that some consumers decide to remain
untreated. The result of Proposition 2 generalizes as follows to the n>2
case:
Proposition 4 Consider the extended basic model with n ≥ 2 degrees of
problem and with consumers who diﬀer in their probabilities of needing dif-
ferent procedures only. Suppose that some consumers remain unserved under
the conditions of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post a single
tariﬀ only).26 Then, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game in which
discriminatory pricing is allowed, the expert will post a menu in which at least
two tariﬀs attract types, one with equal mark-ups, and at least one tariﬀ with
lower mark-ups for cheaper treatments.27 In total all consumers are served.
Low cost consumers are served under the former tariﬀ and always get honest
diagnosis and appropriate treatment, high cost consumers are served under
(one of) the latter(s) and are never under- but sometimes overtreated.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 conﬁrms that our main result that price discrimination en-
tails potential overtreatment of high cost consumers extends to the setting
with n>2 degrees of problem: Again, low cost consumers are eﬃciently
served under an equal mark-up tariﬀ and the rest of the market gets unnec-
essary procedures with strictly positive probability. Also again, no kind of
undertreatment is observed in equilibrium; that is, under all tariﬀso ﬀered,
each customer will always get an intervention that ﬁxes his problem.
The most important change when moving from the two to the more than
two types of problem setting is that there is no longer a guarantee that the
price-discriminating expert will post exactly two tariﬀs, one with equal mark-
ups and one with a higher mark-up for the most advanced intervention. The
only guarantee we have is that the expert will post in addition to the equal
mark-up tariﬀ at least one other tariﬀ, and that each posted contract other
26In opposition to the basic model this condition is needed to make sure that price
discrimination is observed in equilibrium. The reason is, that in the current setting the
boundary solution has ∆1,2,...,n−1,n = v − C1 >v− d − cn, while the boundary solution
in the basic model has ∆12 = v − C1 = v − d − c2.
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than the equal mark-up tariﬀ will provide the expert with incentives to never
under- and to sometimes overtreat customers (i.e., the intervention provided
is always suﬃcient to ﬁx the problem but sometimes a more expensive inter-
vention is provided when a cheaper one would have been suﬃcient to solve
the problem). To get sharper results we would need more information on the
shape of the distribution functions and on the cost diﬀerential between the
diﬀe r e n tt r e a t m e n t s .T os e ew h y ,l o o ka tF i g u r e4 .T h i sﬁgure illustrates the
n =3case. Let us start with a non-discrimination setting in which low cost
consumers (with t ≤ ta
123) are eﬃciently served under the equal mark-up tariﬀ
∆123 while high cost consumers (with t>t a
123) remain untreated. If we now
introduce a ∆003 tariﬀ that leaves zero rents to customers (∆003 = v−d−c3)
then the expert’s proﬁt is unambiguously increased. The reason is, that the
∆003 contract is ﬂat in the expected-utility/type space; that is, it provides
the same utility to all consumers. So all consumers attracted by this contract
can be held to their reservation utility. Using a ∆023 tariﬀ instead of ∆003
has one advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is, that it is more
proﬁtable than the ∆003 contract since it entails a smaller ineﬃciency. The
disadvantage is that the tariﬀ is not ﬂat; that is, it oﬀers rents to lower cost
consumers. So some consumers (in the ﬁgure the market segment [tb
123,t a
123])
who would choose the equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆123 under the two contract menu
(∆123, ∆003) will switch to the less proﬁtable ∆023 contract if this tariﬀ is also
26available. (Here notice that if ∆123, ∆023 and ∆003 attract types, then ∆123 >
∆023 > ∆003.)S o ,w h e t h e ri ti sp r o ﬁtable to post the ∆023 tariﬀ in addition
to (or instead of) the ∆003 contract depends on the magnitude of the two
eﬀects, and the magnitude of the two eﬀects depends on the shape of G0(.),
G1(.) and F(.) a n do nw h e t h e rt h ec o s td i ﬀerential ck+1 −ck is increasing or
decreasing in k.
4.2 Diﬀerences in the Valuation: Undertreatment
Up to now we have investigated settings where consumers diﬀer in their
probabilities of needing diﬀerent treatments only. Now we modify our as-
sumptions and analyze a model where consumers diﬀer in their valuation of
a successful intervention v, but have the same probabilities of needing dif-
ferent procedures. More precisely, we assume that a consumer of type t has
valuation vt = v − t and that consumers’ types are drawn independently
from the same concave distribution F (·),w i t hd i ﬀerentiable strictly positive




. Again, F (·) is assumed to be common knowledge, but
a consumer’s type is the consumer’s private information.
With this speciﬁcation a type t consumer’s expected utility under ∆12 is
vt−C−∆12, where vt = v−t. Similarly, a type t consumer’s expected utility
under ∆02 is vt−C−∆02−g1(c2−c1). Finally, a type t consumer’s expected
utility under ∆10 is vt − C − ∆10 − g2(v − t − c2 + c1).
As is easily veriﬁed, Proposition 1 c o n t i n u e st oh o l di fw er e p l a c et h e
condition c2 −c1 >v−d−c2 by v −C −t<t: if the diﬀerence between the
’best’ and the ’worst’ type is large relative to the eﬃciency gain of treating
the worst type then the non-discriminating expert will again post prices such
that some consumers decide to remain untreated. Proposition 2 changes to:
Proposition 5 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
two treatment qualities. Suppose that consumers diﬀer in their valuation of
a successful intervention v (rather than in their probabilities of needing dif-
ferent treatments). Then, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium,
it is performed via a menu containing two tariﬀs, one with equal mark-ups,
and one with a higher mark-up for the cheaper treatment. High valuation
consumers are served under the former tariﬀ and always get serious diagno-
sis and appropriate treatment; lower valuation consumers are served under
the latter and always get the cheap treatment, sometimes ineﬃciently.
27Proof. First observe that any arbitrary menu of tariﬀs partitions the type-
set into (at most) three subintervals delimited by cut-oﬀ values t02,t 12 and
t10 with 0 ≤ t02,t 12 ≤ t10 ≤ 1 and either t02 =0or t12 =0(or both) such
that (i) either the optimal strategy of types in [0,t 02) is to choose a ∆02 tariﬀ
(if t02 > 0), or the optimal strategy of types in [0,t 12) is to choose a ∆12 tariﬀ
(if t12 > 0), (ii) the optimal strategy of types in (t12,t 10) is to decide for a ∆10
tariﬀ, and (iii) the optimal strategy of types in (t10,1] is to remain untreated.
This follows from the fact that the expected utility under any of these tariﬀs
is strictly decreasing in t, and from the fact that the ∆12 and the ∆02 function
have exactly the same steepness in the expected-utility/type space and that
they are both strictly steeper than the ∆10 function (see Figure 5 below). The
rest of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 the only exception being
that the ∆10 function is not completely ﬂat so that price discrimination may
not be observed in equilibrium even if some consumers are excluded under
the conditions of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post a single
tariﬀ only).
Proposition 5 tells us that in the model where consumers diﬀer in their
valuation of a successful intervention, price discrimination entails potential
undertreatment of low valuation consumers; that is, low valuation consumers
are induced to buy the simple procedure without a serious diagnosis.
The following example (displayed in Figure 5) illustrates the result:
Example: Each consumer has the minor problem with probability g1 =
0.5 and the major one with probability g2 =0 .5.C o n s u m e r sd i ﬀer in their
valuation of a successful intervention. A consumer of type t has valuation
vt =2 0−t. Consumers’ types are independently drawn from an uniform dis-
tribution on [0,10]. The cost of the expensive treatment is nine (c2 =9 ) ,a n d
the cost of the cheap treatment is one (c1 =1 ) . There are no diagnosis costs
(d =0 ) . If the expert can post a single price vector only, then she serves
3/4 of the consumers (ta
12 =7 .5) with the equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆a
12 =7 .5
(see Figure 5). With this policy she earns an expected proﬁto f5.625 per
customer. If the expert is allowed to price-discriminate among consumers
then she increases her expected proﬁt (to 5.8375 per customer) by posting
two tariﬀs, the equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆b
12 =7 .75 and an ’undertreatment tar-
iﬀ’ with mark-up ∆b
10 =4 .5. High valuation consumers (consumers of type
t<t b
12 =5 .5)a r ee ﬃciently served under the equal mark-up tariﬀ,l o w e r
valuation consumers (consumers of type t ∈ [tb
12 =5 .5,t b
10 =9 ] )a r ep o t e n -
tially undertreated under the second tariﬀ, and very low valuation consumers
28(consumers of type t>t b
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Figure 5: Type Dependent Expected Utilities with vt = v − t
Notice that in contrast to the setting where consumers diﬀer in their
probabilities of needing diﬀerent interventions only, price discrimination is
not necessarily observed in equilibrium even if some consumers are excluded
under the conditions of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post
as i n g l et a r i ﬀ only). The reason is similar to the one given in the previous
subsection for the imprecise result of Proposition 4: If we start with a non-
discriminating setting in which the expert posts an equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆12
only, and introduce ∆10 as a second tariﬀ (the ∆02 tariﬀ is strictly dominated
and will therefore never be posted in equilibrium) then the expert proﬁts
because some new consumers (those in the interval [ta
12,t b
12]) are attracted.
At the same time the expert loses because some consumers (those in the
interval between intersection of the dotted line with the ∆b
10-curve and ta
12)
w h ou s e dt ob u yu n d e rt h em o r ep r o ﬁtable equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆a
12 switch to
the less proﬁtable ∆b
10 tariﬀ. Whether the overall eﬀect is positive or negative
depends on parameter constellations, that is, on the shape of the distribution
function F(.), on the size of the valuation v and on the intervention costs c1
and c2.
294.3 Two Dimensional Type Set: Over- and Under-
treatment
Our previous results suggest that in a setting with a two-dimensional type
set over- and undertreatment might coexist in equilibrium. This is indeed the
case as the (discrete) example below shows. Before considering this example
we ﬁrst show that even in a two-dimensional world the expert will always
t r e a ta tl e a s tas u b s e to fc o n s u m e r se ﬃciently.
Proposition 6 Consider the basic model with two degrees of problem and
two treatment qualities. Suppose that consumers diﬀer in their valuation of
a successful intervention and in their probabilities of needing diﬀerent treat-
ments. Further suppose that each consumer has a strictly positive probability
of having each of the diﬀerent problems.28 Then, in any subgame-perfect equi-
librium the expert will post a menu in which an equal mark-up tariﬀ attracts
a nonempty subset of types.
Proof. To see that an optimal menu must have an equal mark-up tariﬀ
which attracts a strictly positive measure of types, suppose to the contrary
that there is no such contract. Then, among the tariﬀs chosen by a strictly
positive measure of types, take the one with the highest mark-up for the
provided treatment and denote it by ∆h.T w oc a s e sh a v et ob ed i s t i n g u i s h e d :
If ∆h is an ’overtreatment tariﬀ’ (that is, a tariﬀ of the ∆02 variety)
denote the type with the lowest g1 among the types attracted by ∆h by th.
Then replace ∆h by an equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆12 such that type th is exactly
indiﬀerent between ∆h and ∆12;t h a ti s ,∆12 = ∆h + g
th
1 (c2 − c1).S i n c e
consumers with a higher g1 gain more by the replacement than the critical
type th, all types attracted by ∆h under the original menu will be attracted
by ∆12 under the new menu. Types not attracted by ∆h under the original
menu will either switch to the more proﬁtable ∆12 tariﬀ or will choose the
same tariﬀ as before the replacement. Thus, since ∆12 > ∆h the new menu
yields a strictly higher proﬁt.
28If consumers need the cheap procedure for sure (gt
1 =1 )t h e nt h et a r i ﬀs ∆10 and
∆12 are indistinguishable from an eﬃciency point of view. Similarly, for consumers who
need the expensive treatment for sure (gt
2 =1 ) ∆02 and ∆12 are indistinguishable from
an eﬃciency point of view. So, to guarantee that the expert will post a menu in which an
equal mark-up tariﬀ attracts a nonempty subset of types at least some consumers must
have gt
1 ∈ (0,1).
30If ∆h is an ’undertreatment tariﬀ’( t h a ti s ,at a r i ﬀ of the ∆10 variety)
denote the type with the lowest g2(v−c2+c1) among the types attracted by
∆h by th. Then replace ∆h by an equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆12 such that type th is
exactly indiﬀerent between ∆h and ∆12;t h a ti s ,∆12 = ∆h+g
th
2 (vth−c2+c1).
Since consumers with a higher g2(v − c2 +c1) gain more by the replacement
than the marginal type th, all types attracted by ∆h under the original menu
will be attracted by ∆12 under the new menu. Types not attracted by ∆h
under the original menu will either switch to the more proﬁtable ∆12 tariﬀ or
w i l lc h o o s et h es a m et a r i ﬀ as before the replacement. Thus, since ∆12 > ∆h
the new menu yields a strictly higher proﬁt.29
Let us now discuss the example announced earlier. In this example all
consumers are eﬃciently served under equal mark-up prices if the expert can
post a single tariﬀ only. With price discrimination the expert uses an equal
mark-up contract to skim oﬀ high valuation / low cost consumers, a tariﬀ
with a higher mark-up for the cheap treatment to undertreat low valuation
/ low cost consumers, and a price vector with a higher mark-up for the
expensive treatment to overtreat high valuation / high cost consumers. Low
valuation / high cost consumers remain unserved with price discrimination
although treating them would be eﬃcient.
Example: There are two degrees of problem (n =2 ) . Each consumer
is characterized by his two-dimensional type (gt
2,vt).C o n s u m e r s ’ t y p e sa r e
independently drawn from an equal probability distribution on the discrete
support {(0.6,1.95), (0.2,2.0), (0.9,3.0), (0.5,3.5)}. There are no diagno-
sis costs (d =0 ) . The cost of the expensive treatment is one (c2 =1 ) ,a n d
t h ec o s to ft h ec h e a pt r e a t m e n ti sz e r o(c1 =0 ) . I ft h ee x p e r tc a np o s t
a single tariﬀ only, then she serves all consumers under the equal mark-
up contract ∆12 =1 .35. W i t ht h i sp o l i c ys h ee a r n sa ne x p e c t e dp r o ﬁto f
1.35 per consumer. If the expert can price discriminate among consumers
then she increases her expected proﬁtt o1.525 per consumer by posting
three price vectors, the equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆12 =2 .5, the ’overtreatment
tariﬀ’ ∆02 =2 .0, and the ’undertreatment tariﬀ’ ∆10 =1 .6.H i g h v a l u a -
tion/medium cost consumers are served eﬃciently under the equal mark-up
tariﬀ, high valuation/high cost customers are potentially overtreated under
∆02, low valuation/low cost consumers are potentially undertreated under
29Here notice that the same proof-technique could be used to prove that the result
continues to hold if we allow for an arbitrary number of problems and an arbitrary number
of interventions.
31∆10 and low valuation/medium cost customers remain untreated.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Research on credence goods markets typically assumes that consumers are
homogeneous. The present article has studied the consequences of dropping
this assumption in a model where an expert has some degree of market power
in providing diagnosis and interventions. With heterogeneous consumers
and market power price discrimination may emerge in equilibrium. In the
case of experts markets, where the expert observes the intervention that
a consumer needs to ﬁx his problem and also provides a treatment, price
discrimination proceeds along the dimension of quality of advice oﬀered. High
quality diagnosis and appropriate treatment is sold to the most proﬁtable
market segment only. Less proﬁtable consumers are induced to demand a
procedure without a serious diagnosis, or get no service at all. The welfare
consequences of price discrimination are ambiguous: On the one hand, price
discrimination increases the number of consumers that get an intervention.
On the other hand, some consumers that are eﬃciently served under non-
discrimination get the wrong procedure if the expert can discriminate among
customers.
O u ra r g u m e n th i n g e so ns o m es o r to fm a r k e tp o w e rf o re x p e r t s . W e
belief that such an assumption is not to hard to defend in the case of experts
markets. Specialization in the expertise (for example medical specialists),
capacity constraints, consumer loyalty (the expert already knows the history
of repairs, the doctor knows the ’Krankengeschichte’ of the client), travel
costs together with location, search costs and many, many other factors might
give rise to market power in credence goods markets.
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336 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds in four steps. In Step 1 we show that an optimal
menu of contracts must have an equal mark-up tariﬀ that attracts a strictly
positive measure of types, in Step 2 that in an optimal menu the equal mark-
up tariﬀ must attract the lowest segment of types and yield the highest proﬁt
per customer and that all other tariﬀs must be such that successively higher
types choose successively less proﬁtable tariﬀs (more precisely, if two types s
and t with s<tchoose two diﬀerent contracts, then the one chosen by s must
be more proﬁtable than the one chosen by t). Our strategy is then to show (in
Step 3) that the expert has never an incentive to post a menu where a tariﬀ
that implies potential undertreatment attracts types, and to show in the end
(Step 4) that the expert has indeed always a strict incentive to cover a strictly
positive interval with at least one tariﬀ that implies potential overtreatment.
Before beginning notice that, relative to the universe of all possible menus
of tariﬀs, no loss of generality is imposed by restricting attention to menus
that contain (at most) a single representative of each of the 2n −1 classes of
tariﬀs discussed in the main text. This follows from the observation that a
consumer who decides for a contract in a given class will always decide for
the one with the lowest ∆. Also notice that a given contract cannot attract
two disjunct subsets of types. This follows from the fact that the expected
utility under ∆0,0,....,0,n is type-independent, while the expected utility under
each other vector is linearly decreasing in t.30 In what follows we denote
the highest type that chooses contract ∆x by tx. Obviously, if the expected
utility under ∆x is steeper than that under ∆y and if both contracts attract
types then tx <t y.31
30We ignore menus containing type-attracting contracts that have exactly he same steep-
ness and exactly the same position in an expected-utility/type diagram since such menus
are always (at least weakly) dominated.
31In an expected-utility/type diagram contracts that have no ”holes” (in the sense that
if pk − ck ≥ pl − cl for some k and all l ∈ {1,...,n} then either p1 − c1 = p2 − c2 = ...
= pk−1−ck−1 = pk −ck, or pk −ck = pk+1 −ck+1 = ... = pn−1 −cn−1 = pn−cn,o rb o t h )
are ordered with respect to their steepness: The expected utility under ∆1,0,0,...,0 is at
least as steep as the expected utility under ∆1,2,0,..,0, the expected utility under ∆1,2,0,...,0
is at least as steep as the expected utility under ∆1,2,3,0,..,0, ...., the expected utility under
∆1,2,3,...n−1,0 is at least as steep as the expected utility under ∆1,2,3,...n−1,n, the expected
utility under ∆1,2,3,...n−1,n is at least as steep as the expected utility under ∆0,2,3,...n−1,n,
....., the expected utility under ∆0,0,...,0,n−1,n is at least as steep as the expected utility
34Step 1 To see that an optimal menu must have an equal mark-up tariﬀ
that attracts a strictly positive measure of types, suppose to the contrary that
there is no such contract. Then, among the tariﬀs chosen by a strictly positive
measure of types, take the one with the highest mark-up for the provided
treatment(s). Denote this contract by ∆h and the highest type attracted
by ∆h by th. Now replace ∆h by an equal mark-up tariﬀ ∆1,2,...,n−1,n such
that type th is exactly indiﬀerent between ∆h and ∆1,2,...,n−1,n.N e x tr e m o v e
all price-vectors that are steeper than ∆1,2,...,n−1,n. Since the expected utility
under each contract is monotonically decreasing in t, all types in [0,t h) will
switch to ∆1,2,...,n−1,n. Types in (th,1] will either move to ∆1,2,...,n−1,n,o rw i l l
choose the same vectors as before the replacement. Thus, since ∆1,2,...,n−1,n >
∆h,32 the new menu yields a strictly higher proﬁt.
Step 2 That, among all tariﬀs that attract a strictly positive measure of
types, the equal mark-up tariﬀ must yield the highest per-customer proﬁt
follows from the shape of the expected utilities under the diﬀerent kinds of
contracts (see previous footnote), and that in an optimal menu the equal
mark-up tariﬀ must attract the lowest segment of types from the ”remove
steeper functions” argument in Step 1 above. To see that all other type-
attracting contracts must be such that successively higher types choose suc-
cessively less proﬁtable contracts (in the above mentioned sense) suppose
ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ee x i s tt w os u b s e t so ft y p e s[ta,ta] and [tb,tb], with ta <t b,
that choose the more proﬁtable tariﬀs ∆a and ∆b while all types in (ta,t b)
choose less proﬁtable ones. Then by removing the tariﬀsc h o s e nb yt h et y p e s
in (ta,t b) the monopolist can increase her proﬁt, as these types will switch
either to ∆a or to ∆b.33 This proves that successively higher types choose ei-
ther successively less or successively more proﬁtable contracts. If they would
choose successively more proﬁtable ones, then the monopolist could increase
her proﬁt by removing all price vectors except the ﬂattest one. With an one
contract menu our statement is trivially true, since diﬀerent types cannot
under ∆0,0,...0,n. Contracts that have holes cannot be positioned in that order.
32For instance, for n =3type th’s expected utility under ∆123 is v −Cth −∆123, while




3 (v−c3+c1),h i s
expected utility under ∆120 is v−Cth −∆120−g
th
3 (v−c3+c1), his expected utility under
∆023 is v −Cth −∆023 −g
th





2 (c3−c2), his expected utility under ∆103 is v−Cth −∆103−g
th
2 (c3−c2),
and his expected utility under ∆020 is v − Cth − ∆020 − g
th
1 (c2 − c1) − g
th
3 (v − c3 + c1).
33Notice that the price vectors previously chosen by the types in (ta,t b) must have been
ﬂatter than ∆a and steeper than ∆b.
35choose diﬀerent contracts.
Step 3 T os e et h a ti tc a n n o tb eo p t i m a lt op o s tam e n uw h e r eat a r i ﬀ
that implies potential undertreatment attracts types, consider an arbitrary
such vector and denote it by ∆u. Since ∆u leads to undertreatment, it must
have pk − ck >p n − cn for at least one and at most n − 1 treatments ck.
Compare this tariﬀ with a contract where the prices for all lower treatments
are exactly as in ∆u, but where pn is adjusted in such a way that cn is among
the provided treatments. (That is, in an n =3framework we compare a
speciﬁc ∆100 vector with the ∆103 vector that has ∆103 = ∆100,as p e c i ﬁc
∆020 vector with the ∆023 vector that has ∆023 = ∆020,a n das p e c i ﬁc ∆120
vector with the ∆123 vector that has ∆123 = ∆120.).34 Denote this new vector
by ∆n. The new tariﬀ has a strictly higher position than ∆u at t =0 ,35 and
it is strictly ﬂatter than ∆u everywhere.36 This implies that in the menu
under consideration (where ∆u attracts customers) no tariﬀ out of the ∆n
class can attract customers. Otherwise we would get a contradiction with the
arguments in Step 2 above, as the ∆n vector would be chosen by higher types
than ∆u and be strictly more proﬁtable. But, if no ∆n vector attracts types
while ∆u does, then we can always get a strict increase in proﬁtb yr e p l a c i n g
∆u by a ∆n vector where the mark-up ∆n is chosen in such a way that type
tu is indiﬀerent between ∆n and ∆u. This proves that it is never optimal to
p o s tam e n uw h e r eat a r i ﬀ that implies potential undertreatment attracts
types. So, if price discrimination is observed in equilibrium it is performed
via a menu that contains at least two tariﬀs, one with equal mark-ups, and
at least one with a lower mark-up for at least one of the cheaper treatments.
Step 4 That the expert has indeed always a strict incentive to post at
least two contracts if some consumers are excluded under the conditions
of Proposition 1 (where the expert is restricted to post a single tariﬀ only)
follows immediately from the arguments in Step 4 of the proof of Proposition
2.
34Again we use the same notation for a class of contracts, for a speciﬁcm e m b e ro ft h a t
class, and for the implied mark-up for the provided treatment(s). No confusion should
result.
35Consider again the n =3example. At t =0 , ∆103 is by (g0
2 + g0
3)(v + c1 − c3) higher
than ∆100, ∆023 is by g0
3(v + c2 − c3) higher than ∆020,a n d∆123 is by g0
3(v + c1 − c3)
higher than ∆120.
36In the n =3example, the diﬀerence in the derivative of the expected utility with
respect to t between ∆100 and ∆103 is (ˆ g2 +ˆ g3)(v +c1 −c3), where ˆ gk stands vor g1
k −g0
k.
Similarly, the diﬀerence in the derivative of the expected utility between ∆020 and ∆023 is
ˆ g3(v + c2 − c3), and the diﬀerence between ∆120 and ∆123 is ˆ g3(v + c1 − c3).
36